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Nonpayment of water bills in Guatemala: Dissatisfaction
or inability to pay?
William F. Vasquez1
1Department of Economics, Fairﬁeld University, Fairﬁeld, Connecticut, USA
Abstract This paper investigates nonpayment behavior in Guatemala. Determinants of nonpayment
behavior are identiﬁed through zero-inﬂated negative binomial regression models in order to take into
account particular distributional characteristics of the amount of outstanding payments. Findings indicate
that nonpayment behavior is a demonstration of consumer dissatisfaction with current water services. The
amount of outstanding bill payments also responds to system unreliability. Results also suggest that non-
payment behaviors are more prominent in community-managed systems than in municipal systems. No evi-
dence was found on a potential relationship between nonpayment behavior and household income. Policy
implications are discussed.
1. Introduction
Cost recovery has become a major challenge for many water utilities in developing countries [e.g., Guevara
Jerez, 2007; Nyarko et al., 2007; Secretarıa de Planiﬁcacion y Programacion de la Presidencia (SEGEPLAN), 2006;
Zhong and Mol, 2010]. System revenues are often not enough to operate water systems, treat water for
drinking purposes, and adequately maintain water infrastructure. Insufﬁcient cost recovery also represents a
major obstacle for service extension, and may lead to suboptimal usage of water resources [Nyarko et al.,
2007]. Thus, acute imbalances between revenues and supply costs jeopardize the sustainable provision of
water services.
Water fees are the primary form of recovering water supply costs, especially for community-managed util-
ities that do not receive ﬁnancial transfers from central or local governments. Unfortunately, in many devel-
oping countries, widespread nonpayment of water bills is an impediment for water utilities to recover water
supply costs [Aguilar-Benitez and Saphores, 2008; Mugabi et al., 2010; Van Schalkwyk, 2012]. Institutional
underdevelopment and lack of managerial capacity could partially explain low collection rates of water fees
[e.g., Zhong and Mol, 2010]. However, household payment behaviors may also affect the effectiveness of
water utilities in collecting water fees. Improved understanding of underlying factors inﬂuencing water bill
payment behavior may help to design appropriate policies for recovering water supply costs, which in turn
would enhance the sustainability of water systems.
The analysis of nonpayment behavior requires moving beyond the presumption that households tend to be
late in their payments due to their inability to pay. The scant literature on nonpayment behavior suggests
that there could be factors other than income constraints that can inﬂuence households to adopt nonpay-
ment behaviors. For instance, Mugabi and Kayaga [2010] and Mugabi et al. [2010] present empirical evi-
dence from Uganda suggesting that nonpayment intentions, which are related to actual nonpayment
behaviors, are mainly based on the perceived control that a person has on performing bill payments, as
well as on attitudes and social pressures. Gorton et al. [2009] found in Macedonia that payment behavior is
related to the satisfaction that farmers derived from being members of community organizations for irriga-
tion. In contexts of institutional underdevelopment where water utilities do not have mechanisms to
enforce bill payments, households may adopt nonpayment behaviors as a means to demonstrate their dis-
satisfaction with the quality of water services [Kayaga et al., 2004]. More empirical research is needed to
identify determinants of nonpayment behaviors at the household level, particularly within existing utility-
consumer relationships in developing countries [Aguilar-Benitez and Saphores, 2008; Mugabi et al., 2010].
This paper investigates why households do not pay their water bills in a timely fashion using a random sam-
ple of 500 households that are served by municipal and community-managed water utilities in the small
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town of San Lorenzo, Guatemala. Particular emphasis is placed on income constraints and consumer satis-
faction with current water services. Determinants of nonpayment behaviors are identiﬁed through
zero-inﬂated negative binomial regression models in order to take into account particular distributional
characteristics of the amount of outstanding payments. Findings indicate that nonpayment behavior is a
demonstration of consumer dissatisfaction with the low quality of water services. The frequency of service
interruptions is found to be another determinant of nonpayment behavior. Results also suggest that non-
payment behaviors are more prominent in community-managed systems as compared to municipal sys-
tems. This analysis did not ﬁnd evidence supporting a potential relationship between nonpayment
behavior and household income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the institutional framework of drinking
water services in Guatemala. Section 3 describes the study site. Section 4 describes the survey design and
sampling procedure. Section 5 introduces the econometric approach used to identify determinants of non-
payment behaviors. Section 6 shows survey and estimation results. Section 7 concludes the paper with a
discussion of results and some policy implications.
2. Drinking Water Services in Guatemala
Guatemala does not have an integral, comprehensive law to regulate the use of water resources or the pro-
vision of safe drinking water. In contrast, the existing water legislation is ambiguous and fragmented across
a number of codes, agreements, and regulations [Ballestero et al., 2005]. The Guatemalan Constitution, as
well as the Municipal and Health Codes, decentralizes the responsibility of providing safe drinking water to
the 335 municipalities in the country. According to the Health Code, the Ministry of Public Health and Social
Assistance (MSPAS, for its initials in Spanish) is responsible for regulating and supervising water utilities in
order to guarantee the universal provision of safe drinking water in urban and rural areas. In addition, the
Institute of Municipal Development (INFOM, for its initials in Spanish) is mandated to invest in water infra-
structure and help to develop the technical and managerial capacities of water utilities. Unfortunately, the
water legislation does not deﬁne clear relations among stakeholders (i.e., water utilities, MSPAS, and INFOM,
among others), which partially explains the lack of coordination in the water sector and the institutional iso-
lation of water utilities [Ballestero et al., 2005].
The municipalities have the legal right to transfer the management of water systems to private entities,
which legitimizes the existence of community-based water organizations (CBWOs) and private utilities in
the country. The municipalities, private utilities, and CBWOs have total autonomy on setting water prices,
enforcing consumer compliance with bill payments, operating water systems, and maintaining water infra-
structure. Given the lack of a comprehensive institutional framework, municipal and private utilities, as well
as CBWOs, operate their water systems according to their own internal regulations and local traditions with
minimal support from government agencies [D’Andrea, 2012].
Municipalities are the main supplier of drinking water in urban areas, serving approximately 70% of urban
households as of 2011 [Vasquez, 2014]. In contrast, CBWOs are the primary providers of water in rural areas
serving about 40% of rural households. Municipalities provide water to 15% of rural households. Private
utilities provide water to approximately 5% of urban and rural households. Unfortunately, water systems
tend to be unreliable, services are frequently interrupted, and tap water is not tested on a regular basis to
guarantee that it is safe to drink [Vasquez, 2014]. Several studies have reported that many urban and rural
systems provide water that is contaminated, thus representing a signiﬁcant health risk at the national level
[e.g., Galindo and Molina, 2007; Instituto de Agricultura, Recursos Naturales y Ambiente (IARNA), 2005;
Vasquez, 2013].
Water utilities seem unable to generate enough revenues to cover the costs of water supply [SEGEPLAN,
2006]. IARNA [2005] estimates that households pay US$0.25 to US$2.00 for 30 cubic meters of water. As a
base of comparison, the cost of water supply in Guatemala City is estimated at US$0.25 to US$0.30 per cubic
meter of water [IARNA, 2005]. According to Economıa, Sociedad, Ambiente, Ingenierıa Consultores [2005] , sys-
tem operation costs are higher in urban centers that depend on groundwater, due to the use of energy for
water pumping. Water utilities are expected to operate in ﬁnancial deﬁcits given that the costs of water sup-
ply surpass water tariffs. However, assessing the economic performance of water systems is difﬁcult given
that many water utilities do not keep updated records of water consumers and ignore the amount of water
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produced. Moreover, municipalities, which could be expected to keep better ﬁnancial information than
community-managed utilities, usually aggregate water system revenues and costs into their general
accounting systems [IARNA, 2005].
Low compliance with bill payments is considered as a key obstacle for cost recovery. According to IARNA
[2005], the percentage of water consumers with outstanding payments can be as high as 70% in some
municipalities. Water utilities seem to lack enforcement mechanisms, although some of them use penalties
and service suspensions to enforce bill payments. However, communities show strong, sometimes violent
opposition when water operators attempt to suspend water services to households that are late in their
payments [Vasquez, 2011]. Against this backdrop, identifying the underlying factors driving nonpayment
behavior among water consumers can be relevant to design policies for cost recovery and sustainable pro-
vision of water services.
3. Study Site
The study site, San Lorenzo is a small municipality of less than 11,000 inhabitants located 243 kilometers
west of Guatemala City. Approximately 90% of San Lorenzo’s population live in rural areas and the local
economy is primarily based on agriculture. Poverty levels in the area are considerably high [SEGEPLAN and
INE, 2006]. More than 83% of San Lorenzo’s inhabitants live below the national poverty line. Extreme pov-
erty is estimated at 32.6%, almost three times higher than the national average of 13% (according to
national extreme and non-extreme poverty lines of 3206 (about US$414) and 6574 (about US$849) quetzals,
respectively [see INE, 2006]). Labor markets are underdeveloped, so some citizens need to emigrate to
urban centers, as well as to other countries, for job opportunities. According to the 2002 national census
[INE, 2002], 12.6% of households in San Lorenzo reported that at least one member of the household had
emigrated in the last 10 years.
Approximately 76% of San Lorenzo’s inhabitants have access to water [INE, 2002]. The municipality provides
water to a total of 300 households in the urban center. In rural San Lorenzo, 10 CBWOs provide water to
more than 2300 households. The smallest CBWO serves 82 households. The largest CBWO reports to have
almost 600 connections. Both municipal and community-managed water services are frequently inter-
rupted. In addition, tap water is not tested on a regular basis so there is no guarantee that the water is safe
to drink. Three water utilities (the municipality and two of the largest CBWOs) report to test their water for
chlorine residual once per month, and one CBWO report to do so once per year. The rest does not test their
water supplies for chlorine residual, presumably because they do not treat the water supplied.
The municipality of San Lorenzo seems to struggle in collecting revenues that could be used to improve
water services. In 2010, the town had revenues of 8.35 million quetzals (about $1.1 million US dollars),
mostly from government transfers. Less than 11% of municipal revenues were locally generated through
taxes and service fees. This ranks San Lorenzo amongst the municipalities with least capacity to generate
local revenues in the state of San Marcos [FUNCEDE, 2011].
Households connected to the municipal system have waters meters so their water bills are determined
according to their consumption. The municipality implements some enforcement mechanisms to promote
on-time bill payments, starting with mailing reminders to households that are 1 month late in their pay-
ments. If the household does not pay its outstanding bills after that reminder, the municipality sends a sec-
ond reminder and charges a penalty equivalent to 50% of the total outstanding amount. The service to
uncompliant households is suspended only as a last resort. The municipality reports that the service has
been suspended in a few occasions only, because households usually pay after being notiﬁed on their late
payments.
On the other hand, CBWOs charge a ﬁxed fee for their water services, regardless of the level consumption,
because water meters have not being installed in rural areas. The smallest CBWO does not charge water
fees and depends exclusively on voluntary provision of inputs to perform system repairs when needed.
Although CBWOs do not keep updated records of water bill payments, they report that several water con-
sumers have outstanding water bills and that it is difﬁcult to enforce on-time bill payment. Their enforce-
ment mechanisms are limited to verbal reminders in general assemblies. Penalties are not imposed and
services are not suspended presumably because CBWOs expect strong community opposition to those
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measures. Enforcement mechanisms have been identiﬁed as a requirement for ﬁnancial health of
community-managed systems [Madrigal et al., 2011]. Thus, household nonpayment behavior may put the
sustainability of water systems at risk, especially in rural areas of San Lorenzo.
4. Survey Design and Sampling Procedure
A household survey was implemented to gather primary data on opinions, behaviors, and preferences
regarding water services in San Lorenzo. The survey design included one-on-one semistructured conversa-
tions and focus groups with local residents implemented through different iterations in order to incorporate
feedback. Individual conversations and a focus group with eight local residents were initially conducted
using a semistructured approach to identify the most pressing water issues in the eyes of the local popula-
tion, and to learn about water behaviors adopted to cope with those issues. That feedback was used to
design the survey questionnaire. Subsequently, two groups of local residents were asked to assess an initial
version of the questionnaire for clarity, readability, and representativeness of local water problems and
potential solutions. Their feedback was incorporated into the questionnaire, which was pretested through a
pilot survey implemented by trained interviewers (local residents) with a random sample of 30 households.
The ﬁnal survey instrument was administered through in-person interviews in June–August 2012.
The survey questionnaire was divided into four sections. The ﬁrst section collected information regarding
service performance and household practices. More speciﬁcally, respondents were asked to report the num-
ber of days in the week prior to the interview in which they experienced service interruptions. The second
section asked respondents to report their satisfaction with different service characteristics. The third section
included a number of economic valuation questions used to elicit household preferences for improved serv-
ices. The ﬁnal section elicited respondents’ sociodemographic information and household characteristics.
Interviewers were instructed to evaluate the interview quality, including their perception on whether the
respondent was truthful in their responses or not.
Although comprehensive assessment tools have been proposed to measure consumer satisfaction with
water characteristics, responsiveness of water utilities, billing, and consumer services [e.g., Fattahi et al.,
2011; Franceschini et al., 2010], several studies have shown that a small number of qualitative questions can
depict consumer satisfaction with water services with a considerable degree of validity [Deichmann and Lall,
2007; Vasquez and Trudeau, 2011; Vasquez et al., 2011]. A similar approach was applied in this study to avoid
respondent fatigue. Respondents were asked to report their satisfaction with four service characteristics
using a four-tiered scale: (1) very unsatisﬁed, (2) unsatisﬁed, (3) satisﬁed, and (4) very satisﬁed. Water prices,
pressure levels, water treatment, and service hours were selected to be evaluated based on preliminary
focus group discussions that revealed that water consumers are particularly dissatisﬁed with those
attributes.
The survey elicited information about nonpayment behavior of water consumers. The (translated) question
reads as follows: How many of your water bills are pending of payment, if any? The question was carefully
worded, and tested in focus groups. In addition, respondents were assured that their answers were anony-
mous and conﬁdential, and that they would be used in aggregate analyses that would not identify them in
any way. Responses to the nonpayment behavior question provide count data on outstanding payments of
water bills. Given that the municipality and sampled CBWOs do not have reliable records of outstanding
payments, the self-reported number of outstanding payments elicited by the survey instrument represents
an alternative, dependable measure of nonpayment behavior.
The survey was administered to a total of 500 households in the urban center and the rural village of Santa
Rosa. Both the smallest and largest CBWOs coexist in this village to provide water services. Out of the 500
sampled households, 52 are served by the smallest CBWO, 264 by the largest CBWO, and 184 are connected
to the municipal system. A simple protocol was implemented to select the sampled households. In order to
identify the next house to be interviewed, interviewers were instructed to generate a random number in
the ﬁeld. Appointments were arranged with sampled households that did not have time to respond the
questionnaire in the ﬁrst visit. Interviewers were instructed to replace a few households that could not be
interviewed after a second visit. This study excluded the 52 households served by the smallest CBWO
because this organization does not charge water fees. Consequently, the analysis of nonpayment behavior
is conducted using 448 valid responses.
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5. Econometric Modeling
From a conceptual perspective, the distribution of outstanding payments reported by sampled households
can be inﬂuenced by two groups: complaint and noncompliant consumers. The latter can report a non-
negative amount of outstanding payments as some of them could be on time with their payments at the
moment of the survey. On the other hand, compliant consumers would always report to have no outstand-
ing payments, which would increase the number of zeros in the distribution (i.e., excess zeros). The distribu-
tion of outstanding payments analyzed here shows a considerable concentration at zero (72%), as well as
some overdispersion. The zero-inﬂated negative binomial (ZINB) regression model is suitable to address the
overdispersion and excess zeros usually observed in count data. In the ZINB model, the response variable Yi,
outstanding payments in this study, has a probability mass function as follows:
PrðYi5yiÞ5
pi1ð12piÞ /li1/
 /
;
ð12piÞ Cð/1yiÞCðyi11ÞCð/Þ
li
li1/
 yi /
li1/
 /
yi50
yi51; 2; ::
8>>><
>>:
(1)
where pi is the probability that individual i is a compliant water consumer, / is the reciprocal of the disper-
sion parameter with /> 0, li is the mean of the negative binomial speciﬁcation (i.e., when pi5 0), and C(.)
is the gamma function. The parameters pi and li are assumed to depend on vectors of explanatory variables
Xi and Zi as follows:
log
pi
12pi
 
5Zid and log lið Þ5Xib; i51; 2; :::; n (2)
where d and b are vectors of parameters to be estimated using a maximum likelihood technique. It is
assumed in this study that vectors X and Z include the same variables (i.e., X5 Z).
Table 1 shows the covariates used to estimate the ZINB model presented in equations (1) and (2). A satisfaction
index (SATISFINDEX) is included to test the hypothesis that outstanding payments are a demonstration of dissat-
isfaction with current water services (i.e., bSATISFINDEX< 0). The variables UNRELIABLE, COLORED, and COMMUNAL
are also included to investigate how households respond to different service characteristics in their decision of
paying late their water bills. Households are expected to have more outstanding payments as service interrup-
tions are more frequent (i.e., bUNRELIABLE> 0). Water appearance may also affect households’ decision to pay late
their water bills. Hence, the binary indicator COLORED is included to investigate how households respond to
water appearance. Households reporting that their water is colored are expected to have more outstanding pay-
ments than households that do not report so (i.e., bCOLORED> 0), as a protest for the low quality of water.
Table 1. Variables Deﬁnition and Descriptive Statistics
Variables Definition Mean S.D.
PAYMENTS Number of outstanding payments 1.143 2.294
SATISFINDEX Standardized index of satisfaction 0 1
UNRELIABLE Days per week with service interruptions 2.577 2.083
COMMUNAL If the water service is provided by a
community-based organization (15 Yes; 05Otherwise)
0.593 0.492
HHINCOMEa Monthly household income (in 1000’s quetzals) 1.493 1.788
REMITTANCESa Monthly remittances (in 1000’s quetzals) 0.414 0.852
WATERBILL Monthly water bill (in quetzals) 21.452 10.636
COLORED If the tap water is colored (15 Yes; 05Otherwise) 0.192 0.394
HHSIZE Household size 5.707 2.369
LIVING Number of years living in current housing unit 20.444 13.510
ROOMS Number of rooms in the housing unit 3.704 1.672
OWN If the household owns the housing unit (15 Yes; 05Otherwise) 0.941 0.236
CATHOLIC If the respondent is catholic (15 Yes; 05Otherwise) 0.243 0.429
PROTESTANT If the respondent is protestant (15 Yes; 05Otherwise) 0.611 0.488
FEMALE If the respondent is female (15 Yes; 05Otherwise) 0.723 0.448
EDUC Respondent’s years of schooling 6.123 4.579
BOTTLED If the household consumes bottled water (15 Yes; 05Otherwise) 0.286 0.452
aIncome and remittances intervals are: 05 no income; 15 less than 1000 quetzals; 25 1000–2000 quetzals; . . .; 105 9000–10,000
quetzals; and 115more than 10,000 quetzals.
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The binary indicator COMMUNAL is
included to investigate potential dif-
ferentials in nonpayment behaviors
between households with municipal
services and households served by
community-managed systems. Nonpay-
ment behaviors are expected to be
more prevalent in community-managed
systems than in the municipal system
(i.e., bCOMMUNAL> 0) given that, com-
pared to the municipality, CBWOs in
San Lorenzo seem to lack managerial
skills (as shown, e.g., by inexistent or
outdated records of water consumers)
and payment enforcement mecha-
nisms. The vector of covariates also includes the variables WATERBILL, HHINCOME, and REMITTANCES to test
the hypothesis that households have outstanding payments due to their inability to pay for water services. The
variable WATERBILL is expected to have a positive effect on the number of outstanding payments (i.e.,
bWATERBILL> 0) given that it can be more difﬁcult for households to pay higher water bills. On the other hand,
the number of outstanding payments is expected to decrease with household income (i.e., bHHINCOME< 0) and
remittances (i.e., bREMITTANCES< 0) because richer households have more ability to pay. Other household and
individual characteristics are also included to control for the heterogeneity of respondents and their households.
No prior expectations on the effect of those characteristics are held so those effects remain to be empirically
estimated.
6. Survey and Estimation Results
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 provide a proﬁle for the average respondent. Approximately 72%
of the respondents were females, presumably because interviews were held during working hours when
males are more likely to be out of home. The average respondent has barely ﬁnished elementary school,
and has lived in their current home for about 20 years. More than 94% of sampled households are home-
owners of housing units that have an average of (almost) four rooms. On average, households have almost
six members, earn a monthly income of 1114 quetzals (143.74 US dollars), and receive 268 quetzals (34.58
US dollars) from relatives living in another city or country. These low levels of income and remittances are
consistent with the high levels of poverty prevalent in the area.
Table 1 also shows some indicators on system reliability. Approximately 59% of the sampled households
receive water from a community-managed system. The rest is served by the municipal system. Respondents
reported experiencing service interruptions approximately three days per week. In addition, water pressure
seems to vary across the town presumably because the system is inappropriate to serve households in
more elevated areas. About 24% of respondents indicate that water pressure is low, almost 45% report reg-
ular pressure in their water ﬂows, and 31% report having water services with high pressure. Monthly water
bills are relatively low with an average of 21.45 quetzals (about 2.77 US dollars). The average bill is equiva-
lent to 1.93% of the average household income (or 1.55% if remittances are added), which is below interna-
tionally accepted thresholds of water affordability [see Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 2003].
Figure 1 shows reported levels of satisfaction with prices, treatment, pressure, and service hours. A majority
of respondents report that they are satisﬁed with current service characteristics. However, there exist a sig-
niﬁcant percentage of respondents who show some dissatisfaction particularly with the number of hours
per day they receive water services. A signiﬁcant percentage of respondents are also dissatisﬁed with cur-
rent levels of water pressure (approximately 45%) and water treatment (almost 40% of respondents). Water
price is the service characteristic that generates less dissatisfaction among respondents. Table 2 shows that
reported levels of satisfaction with price, treatment, pressure, and service hours are associated to a single,
latent satisfaction scale. Therefore, factor analysis of all four characteristics is conducted to uncover the
Figure 1. Consumer satisfaction with current water services.
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single satisfaction scale and thus estimate a
standardized satisfaction index. Satisfaction
with daily service hours and water pressure
show the highest factor loadings. Item-total
correlations and Cronbach’s alpha coefﬁcients
also show a considerable association between
reported levels of satisfaction and a latent sin-
gle scale.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of outstanding payments. A majority of respondents are on time with their
payments. However, a substantial amount of respondents (28%) report to be late in their payments. The
average of outstanding (monthly) payments among noncompliant households is 3.62 and the variance is
equal to 7.73. This represents a considerable obstacle for water utilities that could use those revenues to
improve infrastructure maintenance and service sustainability. The overdispersion and high concentration
of respondents that are on time with their payments are particular characteristics of a zero-inﬂated negative
binomial process.
Table 3 shows a zero-inﬂated negative binomial model estimated using STATA 13.1 in order to identify
some determinants of nonpayment behavior. Likelihood ratio tests of the dispersion alpha coefﬁcient indi-
cate that negative binomial regression outperforms Poisson regression in modeling the overdispersed data
at hand. In addition, Vuong’s [1989] test indicates that the data follows a zero-inﬂated process. The concen-
tration of zero outstanding payments can be due to two types of respondents: (1) the compliant respond-
ent that is always on time with her payments, and (2) the noncompliant respondent (i.e., prone to have
outstanding payments) who happened to be on time with her payments at the moment of the survey.
Therefore, a zero-inﬂated negative binomial model was used to estimate the marginal effects on the num-
ber of outstanding bill payments and on the probability of being a compliant consumer.
The marginal effects of SATISFINDEX are statistically signiﬁcant (see Table 3), which suggests that consumer
satisfaction with water services is a determinant of nonpayment behavior. Estimated marginal effects indi-
cate that the number of outstanding payments would decrease by approximately 0.3 outstanding pay-
ments if consumer satisfaction is increased by one standard deviation. Kayaga et al. [2004] also found a
signiﬁcant relationship between consumer satisfaction and nonpayment behavior in Uganda. The marginal
effects of UNRELIABLE are positive and statistically signiﬁcant indicating that the number of outstanding
payments increases with the frequency of service interruptions. Also, estimated marginal effects of COMMU-
NAL suggest that households served by community-managed systems have more outstanding payments
than households with municipal services. This is expected given that the municipality has more managerial
skills and enforcement mechanisms than CBWOs. It is worth to note that none of the budgetary variables
(i.e., household income and remittances), nor the water bill, are found to be statistically signiﬁcant for out-
standing payments. This suggests that nonpayment behavior is not a reﬂection of inability to pay.
Results also show that the number of
outstanding payments decreases with
each additional household member.
Compared to smaller households,
larger households have more mem-
bers who can take the time to pay
their water bills. Home ownership has
a positive effect on the number of out-
standing payments. On average,
homeowners have almost one more
outstanding payment than home rent-
ers. Rental contracts may hold
accountable whoever is responsible
for paying the water bill, landlord, or
renter. Regardless of who agreed to
pay the water bill, both of them may
have few outstanding payments, if
Table 2. Factor Analysis of Consumer Satisfaction
Factor Loadings KMO
Service hours per day 0.931 0.578
Water pressure 0.966 0.577
Water treatment 0.589 0.639
Water price 0.558 0.909
Single satisfaction scale 0.6245
Figure 2. Outstanding payments of water bills.
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any, to fulﬁl their rental contract. More
educated individuals and respondents
who consume bottled water report to
have a smaller number of outstanding
payments. It can be presumed that
those individuals are more aware of
the beneﬁts of having access to water
and, consequently, tend to adopt bet-
ter bill payment behaviors than indi-
viduals who are not aware of those
beneﬁts.
Interestingly, ﬁndings indicate that
respondents with catholic or protes-
tant afﬁliation have more outstanding
payments than respondents who
reported not to practice any religion.
This is unexpected given that religious
norms tend to emphasize honesty and
compliance. Given that the number of
outstanding payments is self-reported,
this result may suggest that catholic
and protestant respondents were
more truthful in reporting their out-
standing payments than individuals
with no religious afﬁliation. Other
covariates seem to have little inﬂuence, if any, on the number of outstanding payments.
The ZINB model also allows for estimating marginal effects on the probability that the average individual is
always on time with her payments (i.e., being a compliant consumer). Estimated effects of SATISFINDEX sug-
gest that individuals with higher levels of satisfaction with current water services are more likely to be com-
pliant consumers than respondents with lower satisfaction levels (see Table 3). In contrast, the probability
of being a compliant consumer decreases with service interruptions. Results also indicate that the probabil-
ity of being a compliant consumer is lower in CBWOs than in the municipal system by almost 22 percentage
points. While WATERBILL is insigniﬁcant for the number of outstanding payments, its marginal effect on the
probability of being a compliant consumer is negative and signiﬁcant. This suggests that individuals are less
likely to comply with their payments when water bills increase. Estimated marginal effects of LIVING indi-
cate that the likelihood of being a compliant consumer increases with the number of years that individuals
have lived in their housing unit. Individuals tend to create stronger links with their neighbors over time and
those relations may function as social pressure mechanisms to comply with payments of water bills. Other
variables seem to have little inﬂuence on the probability of being a compliant consumer.
As a robustness check, Table 4 presents two zero-inﬂated negative binomial models that follow the same
speciﬁcation to the model in Table 3 but are estimated using different subsamples of seemingly truthful
respondents as an attempt to mitigate potential underreporting of outstanding payments. The ﬁrst model
was estimated using a subsample of respondents who seemed to be truthful in the eyes of the interviewers.
A total of 19 respondents were excluded given that the interviewers perceived some degree of dishonesty
in their responses. In addition, a subsample of religious respondents was used to estimate the second
model under the assumption that catholic and protestant respondents would be more truthful in reporting
the amount of outstanding bill payments than respondents who do not practice any religion. Both models
yielded marginal effects that are comparable, in terms of sign and signiﬁcance, to the model estimated
using the full sample of respondents. An exception is that the marginal effect of LIVING becomes signiﬁcant
in both models (see Table 4). This result suggests that the number of outstanding payments decreases with
the time that an individual has lived in their current housing unit.
Endogeneity is often a concern in cross-sectional data. In the context of this study, the consumer satisfac-
tion index could be endogenous because some attitudinal variables (e.g., trust on water utilities) that are
Table 3. ZINB Model of Outstanding Payments (Marginal Effects)a
Number of
Outstanding
Payments
Probability of
Being a
Compliant
Consumer
SATISFINDEX 20.302 (0.114)*** 0.074 (0.016)***
UNRELIABLE 0.366 (0.066)*** 20.043 (0.016)***
COMMUNAL 0.788 (0.130)*** 20.216 (0.080)***
WATERBILL 20.004 (0.006) 20.002 (0.001)***
HHINCOME 0.148 (0.165) 20.009 (0.054)
REMITTANCES 0.020 (0.246) 20.018 (0.022)
COLORED 0.078 (0.294) 0.015 (0.035)
HHSIZE 20.041 (0.001)*** 0.018 (0.020)
LIVING 20.010 (0.007) 0.003 (0.001)***
ROOMS 0.053 (0.030)* 0.015 (0.027)
OWN 0.842 (0.192)*** 20.070 (0.054)
CATHOLIC 0.184 (0.100)* 0.018 (0.060)
PROTESTANT 0.355 (0.185)* 0.006 (0.040)
FEMALE 0.010 (0.109) 0.161 (0.101)
EDUC 20.060 (0.032)* 20.010 (0.013)
BOTTLED 20.442 (0.021)*** 0.004 (0.127)
Zero observations 300
Positive observations 139
AIC 964.51
BIC 968.60
Alpha coefﬁcient 0.316***
Vuong test (Z score) 4.09***
aNotes: ***, **, * imply signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively;
numbers in parentheses are corresponding standard errors clustered by COM-
MUNAL. Vuong tests are performed without clustering errors.
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unobservable may be related to both consumer satisfaction and outstanding payments. In that case, mar-
ginal effects of consumer satisfaction could be biased. The possibility of endogeneity, however, seems to be
minimal because estimated marginal effects are stable across different model speciﬁcations. Nevertheless, a
control function approach was applied to test for potential endogeneity of consumer satisfaction [see Terza
et al., 2008]. A binary indicator on whether a child had experienced at least one episode of diarrhea in the
last month was used as instrument (signiﬁcant at 5% level). Estimated coefﬁcients on residuals predicted
from a ﬁrst-stage regression model of consumer satisfaction were found to be statistically insigniﬁcant, rul-
ing out the potential endogeneity of consumer satisfaction.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper investigated the determinants of nonpayment behaviors using household survey data from the
small, poor town of San Lorenzo, Guatemala. Survey results indicate that a majority of respondents is on
time with their payments of water bills. However, 28% of respondents report to have an average of 3.62
outstanding (monthly) payments, which can put the sustainability of water service provision at risk. Results
also show a considerable degree of dissatisfaction with current water services, particularly with service inter-
ruptions and pressure levels. Given the considerable percentage of seemingly compliant consumers (i.e.,
zero outstanding payments) and data overdispersion, zero-inﬂated negative binomial regression models
were estimated to identify determinants of nonpayment behaviors. Estimation results indicate that con-
sumer satisfaction and service interruptions are the primary determinants of nonpayment behavior, and
that nonpayment behavior is more prevalent in community-managed systems than in the municipal utility.
It was also found that the probability of being a compliant consumer decreases when water bills increase.
No evidence was found to support the hypothesis that nonpayment behavior is a result of inability to pay.
These results suggest that future analyses of nonpayment behavior need to move beyond the presumption
that households do not pay their bills because they are poor. Other factors such as dissatisfaction with serv-
ice performance can be more inﬂuential in adopting nonpayment behaviors, particularly in contexts with
weak institutions.
Table 4. ZINB Models of Outstanding Payments Using Subsamples of Seemingly Truthful Respondents (Marginal Effects)a
Subsample
Respondents Who Seemed Truthful to
Interviewers Respondents With Religious Affiliation
Number of
Outstanding
Payments
Probability of
Being a
Compliant
Consumer
Number of
Outstanding
Payments
Probability of
Being a
Compliant
Consumer
SATISFINDEX 20.302 (0.096)*** 0.071 (0.019)*** 20.250 (0.096)*** 0.073 (0.037)**
UNRELIABLE 0.361 (0.052)*** 20.039 (0.012)*** 0.407 (0.090)*** 20.038 (0.013)***
COMMUNAL 0.809 (0.160)*** 20.272 (0.072)*** 0.607 (0.158)*** 20.214 (0.025)***
WATERBILL 20.005 (0.007) 20.002 (0.001)** 0.001 (0.011) 20.002 (0.001)***
HHINCOME 0.150 (0.128) 20.015 (0.049) 0.093 (0.199) 0.005 (0.058)
REMITTANCES 0.017 (0.234) 20.008 (0.009) 0.052 (0.285) 20.041 (0.0003)***
COLORED 0.042 (0.319) 0.010 (0.042) 0.152 (0.286) 20.023 (0.028)
HHSIZE 20.042 (0.003)*** 0.017 (0.018) 20.049 (0.017)*** 0.017 (0.020)
LIVING 20.011 (0.007)* 0.003 (0.001)** 20.013 (0.007)* 0.003 (0.002)*
ROOMS 0.062 (0.021)*** 0.017 (0.027) 0.084 (0.061) 0.010 (0.006)*
OWN 0.974 (0.151)*** 20.116 (0.044)*** 0.791 (0.164)*** 20.007 (0.040)
CATHOLIC 0.180 (0.046)*** 20.006 (0.105)
PROTESTANT 0.338 (0.121)*** 20.034 (0.018)* 0.225 (0.125)* 20.005 (0.010)
FEMALE 0.013 (0.104) 0.146 (0.101) 0.010 (0.109) 0.223 (0.118)*
EDUC 20.058 (0.025)** 20.010 (0.010) 20.052 (0.037) 20.011 (0.014)
BOTTLED 20.461 (0.023)*** 20.017 (0.095) 20.550 (0.005)*** 0.060 (0.067)
Zero observations 286 257
Positive Observations 134 119
AIC 932.83 828.37
BIC 936.87 832.30
Alpha coefﬁcient 0.300*** 0.347***
Vuong test (Z score) 4.11*** 4.06***
aNotes: ***, **, * imply signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; numbers in parentheses are corresponding standard
errors clustered by COMMUNAL. Vuong tests are performed without clustering errors.
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The prevalence of nonpayment behaviors may generate a vicious circle with poor cost recovery, low-quality
services, and further incentives for not paying water bills. Findings suggest that water utilities have control
on some determinants of nonpayment behavior that can help breaking that vicious circle. For instance, a
reduction in the number of outstanding bill payments can be expected from reducing the frequency of
service interruptions. Furthermore, enhancing the balance between water prices and service quality (i.e.,
the number of daily hours with water services, pressure levels, and water quality) would help rising con-
sumer satisfaction levels, which in turn would promote compliant payment behaviors. Improving water
pressure and increasing the number of daily hours with water services would have the biggest impact on
consumer satisfaction, so water utilities in San Lorenzo could prioritize potential investments to improve
those service characteristics. Government agencies such as the Ministry of Health and the Institute of
Municipal Development could assist municipal and community-managed utilities to improve their infra-
structure and the quality of water services.
CBWOs seem to be less effective than the municipality in collecting bill payments. The lack of payment
enforcement mechanisms is a primary concern for the ﬁnancial sustainability of community-managed sys-
tems elsewhere [e.g., Madrigal et al., 2011]. This is particularly true in Guatemala where CBWOs are institu-
tionally isolated [Vasquez, 2014]. CBWOs may lack administrative capacities and legal mechanisms needed
to enforce water bill payments. It may also be more difﬁcult for CBWOs to collect water payments due to
social pressures. Future studies may further investigate the reasons why CBWOs are less effective in collect-
ing bill payments than municipalities. Logical extensions to this study include analyzing the role of other
behavioral and normative factors that were unobserved in this study. For instance, trust in water utilities, as
well as household perceptions of fairness in water fees and sanctioning mechanisms, can affect nonpay-
ment behaviors. It is hoped that this study will motivate further contributions to the scant literature on non-
payment behavior in the water sector, particularly in developing countries.
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